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Abstract. Assured information sharing among different organizations in a 
coalitional environment is an important first step in accomplishing many critical 
tasks. For example, different security agencies may need to share intelligence 
information for detecting terrorist plots. At the same, each organization 
participating in the assured information sharing process may have different 
incentives. In this paper, we explore the effects of different incentives and 
potential trust issues among organizations on the assured information sharing 
process by developing an evolutionary game theoretic framework. In addition, 
we provide extensive simulation analysis that illustrates the impact of various 
different information sharing strategies. 
1   Introduction 
Many current challenges require different organizations to share critical information. 
Defending against the threats of international terrorism presents this scenario in an 
alarming manner. Countries that are concerned about an attack on native soil must 
frequently consider assailants that have collaborators which span the globe. A single 
country rarely has the necessary resources and jurisdiction to continuously investigate 
every possible suspect. Even if the resources are available, unless attacks are expected 
to have a considerable impact, it is not likely that the investment is cost-effective.  
Thus, a variety of agreements have been created in the course of history to attempt to 
unite multiple governing bodies under a common threat by exchanging information 
with their allies. 
Unfortunately, in the scope of international politics, the only governing factor that 
ensures members of an alliance will always cooperate fully lies in their individual 
incentives. Unless information can be verified, there are no guarantees that the 
information supplied will be truthful. In addition, in some cases, there exists the 
potential for increasing gain from an information exchange by presenting false 
knowledge. In such cases, if the other party’s knowledge is truthful, and the malicious 
party is not caught, a one-sided gain could occur. Thus, one of the biggest challenges 
in such endeavors is how to encourage honest assured information sharing. 
The study of game theory deals directly with the motivations of participants, 
known as players, attempting to achieve some known goal and the choices they must 
make to do so. Out of all options available, game theory assumes that each participant 
wishes to maximize their own personal benefit in a rational manner. At any given 
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time in an information exchange, both participants have the option of telling the truth, 
providing false data or providing no data.  While it may seem obvious that all parties 
would collectively benefit from the truth, each individual is often only concerned with 
their own gains [14]. If that gain comes at the expense of another participant with no 
threat of retribution, there is little encouragement to do otherwise.  
However, when games are repeated, new constraints begin to emerge on a player's 
strategies. If a participant chooses to lie, they run the risk of being caught, leading to a 
potential net loss. When a central authority can observe actions and affect the payout 
a player receives, enforcement of the agreement often becomes a simple manner of 
finding an appropriate punishment. When considering agreements between multiple 
sovereign governing entities, there is not necessarily any central authority that can 
enforce such punishments. In such cases, the burden of ensuring an ideal situation is 
created is shifted to the collective actions of the group. 
One option a player has within such a scenario is to simply refuse to participate. 
This can include all members, or just a selection of those that are not giving the 
desirable responses. If one player has information that is highly desirable to the rest, 
with little dependence on others, they can potentially influence the choices by the 
entire group. On a level playing field, where no player has information that is 
significantly more valuable, a single player which no longer communicates with the 
rest can be sacrificed with little trouble. Clearly, collective action must be taken by a 
significant number of participants to have any effect on group. Thus, several players 
must be willing to isolate the same player with undesirable behavior in the hopes that 
the malicious participant will change their ways.   
Another more indirect method of enforcing behavior is to base punishment 
indirectly on the level of trust shared by the players.  Normally, each player already 
has opinions of the rest, but they lack a broader view of the situation and must assume 
that how a player deals with them is how they deal with everyone else. Eigentrust [22] 
provides a means of collectively allowing each individual player to form accurate 
opinions of the group by providing ratings of their own experiences.  Such opinions 
can be gathered in a distributed manner and provide the rough equivalent of an 
‘omniscient’ view of the rest.   
Several of these factors have already been explored in other works (e.g., [21]). 
However, a factor that has not always been considered is the cost of determining 
whether or not information is correct.  While there is certainly data that can easily be 
verified, that nature of certain kinds of information requires a much more in-depth 
review. Thus, the cost of verification should always be considered in situations where 
the net gain of the interactions is paramount to the success or failure of an exchange.  
The goal of our work is to explore the potential of punishment via isolation with 
regards to the introduction of trust computations. We wish to determine whether or 
not such methods are viable in large games with multiple players with different 
incentive structures, and consider various scenarios that such logic may face.  Success 
of such a method would prove useful in a variety of decentralized assured information 
sharing platforms.   
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes existing work on the 
subject, including our own.  Section 3 describes our model. Section 4 discusses how 
we setup our experiments while section 5 details our results. Finally, we share our 
own conclusions on the subject in section 6 and consider future directions of the field. 
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2   Related Work 
One closely related area to our current work is the research on incentive issues in 
peer-to-peer file sharing networks. Within these file sharing systems, independent 
players join and leave at their leisure, seeking to download a file or files with the help 
of other participants. Problems arise when a new participant joins the network and 
download a resource from other peers and never actually contribute to the group. This 
process, known as leeching, has been a large problem in piece-meal file sharing 
protocols such as the popular BitTorrent. The work of Gupta et al. [20] and 
Buragohain et al. [19] both deal with this behavior by creating a system of incentives 
for further contribution. 
In our previous work [21], we provide a simpler model that excludes distributed 
trust from behavior influence and focuses on how individual agents indirectly can 
contribute towards achieving a common goal in a virtual game of assured information 
sharing.  Agents were permitted to shift their behavioral choices to more effective 
means through analysis at a fixed interval. The LivingAgent (more on this later) was 
introduced as a competitive alternative to the Tit-for-Tat strategy, and the former 
worked well in the constraints provided. However, it still suffered from a need for 
‘critical mass’ of the behavior’s presence before it was effective.   
A great deal of research has dealt with trust in the realm of distributed systems.  
Information exchange methods have been particularly useful in the formation of ad-
hoc networks. Seredynski et al. [1] used the concept of an evolving genetic algorithm 
to enhance security and trust in a wireless network among multiple nodes relaying 
data packets. Other works have taken a purely game-theoretic approach to trust.  The 
work of Cascella [2] performed analysis of an infinitely repeated form of the 
prisoner’s dilemma with regard to persistent players randomly selected. They found 
the introduction of a reputation system allowed punishment systems based on 
discriminating between good and bad reputations succeeded as long as players were 
sufficiently patient to achieve the results. Other works have attempted to apply peer-
to-peer trust in scenarios involving military joint cooperation in the field [3].  Given a 
military body as a dividable resource, they attempt to address the problem of resource 
allocation in situations where either a central authority is not robust enough or the 
resources span multiple international owners. The core issues they addressed were 
dealing with malicious reports attempting to sabotage trust ratings and attempting to 
give more control to an agent’s own rating. 
3   Our Model 
Our previous work on the subject of behavior enforcement in distributed information 
sharing focused solely on the feasibility of the verification and punishment process.  
Several experiments proved conclusively that the LivingAgent behavior outlined in 
[21] both helped to eliminate malicious agents and eventually become the dominate 
strategy in an adaptive game. We plan to build upon the success of that agent by 
integrating distributed trust metrics into the decision making process. 
The scenario for our information exchange strategies is based on a loose alliance 
with no central authority to enforce behavior. Consider multiple nations that have 
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learned of an impending terrorist attack.  They do not have conclusive data to suggest 
when or where the attack will occur, but each country has reason to believe it may 
occur on their own soil. Their objective is to attempt to thwart the current threat.  
However, given an indefinite time span in which the attack could occur and limited 
resources, they have each determined they must ask other countries for help. After 
discovering each of them had a common goal, they have formed an alliance in which 
they exchange information they have collected both at home and abroad. The nature 
of the game is one which occurs repeatedly for an indefinite amount of time.   
Information is exchanged between members of the alliance individually at a regular 
interval. The transaction occurs between two countries in such a way that the data is 
swapped simultaneously; both countries must decide on their strategy before the 
transaction is complete. Each of these transactions occurs between all possible pairs 
of countries simultaneously, assuming each pair agrees to do business. The value of 
the information fluctuates within predictable boundaries, and no player has a 
considerable advantage over the rest.  
Each player faces that challenge that they do not know of the kind of behavior the 
members will engage in. While all countries involved are assumed to have a common 
goal, they may also see an opportunity to advance other political statements. For 
example, one country may wish to keep what they know a secret from the rest, in the 
hopes of learning more at no real cost.   
The strategies chosen by each country is determined by the overall behavior they 
have chosen.  Each country wishes to find the optimal strategy to reduce the impact of 
defense on their national budget. We assume thus that countries are willing to adapt 
by altering the behavior to reflect the one they believe has performed the best. At the 
same time, as behaviors shift, the payouts of strategy choices may shift as well, 
leading to a dynamic balance of power. For example, a behavior to always lie may 
perform well when other countries are not verifying, but as others learn of the benefits 
of the behavior, others may follow suit. This would result in several liars always lying 
to each other and never gaining any information.   
Determining whether or not the data is received is legitimate is the responsibility of 
the country itself. Since the data is primarily intelligence, verifying it has a substantial 
cost due to the resources, manpower, and time required. In our scenario, verification 
is always less than the value of the information itself, which means consistently doing 
so will still result in a net gain.  However, it is not necessarily the most efficient. 
The use of adaptation to improved behaviors within a game raises an interesting 
point about the duration of punishment. One option is to punish a deviating agent 
indefinitely. When this is done, any future benefit from that agent is simply not 
possible, potentially allowing more forgiving agents to flourish. Instead, punishment 
in our game is done in such a way that the other player simply loses a significant 
amount of their own potential earnings, reducing their net gain from the game. This 
indirectly makes the ideal behaviors much more likely to be chosen. Eventually, if 
this is practiced widely enough, overall behavioral choices yield an ideal environment  
where everyone can benefit. Likewise, when we have a fixed interval when agents 
may take the opportunity to change behaviors, we would potentially discourage what 
may otherwise be an excellent source of profit; thus, forgiveness must be performed 
by all agents during this round. An example of this would be when a government 
agency has a new leader or a business comes to the end of a fiscal quarter. 
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Determining reputations within a distributed network can be a difficult endeavor.  
Since it is possible for a malicious participant to deal honestly with some players and 
dishonestly with others, a trust value must extend beyond a local perspective. This 
necessitates querying others for their opinions on opponents within the game, which 
introduces the possibility of the same malicious agents simply telling others they have 
an outstanding rating while their peers have just the opposite. This introduces the 
additional possibility that different players will come to separate conclusions, based 
on the ‘noise’ introduced by the subversion. Sepandar [22] et al. devised the 
EigenTrust algorithm as an answer to these problems.  
The algorithm itself is relatively straightforward. Each player queries every other 
player for their opinion on the rest. This forms a matrix of relative trust, based on a 
score built from history among individual agents. From here, a normalized matrix is 
constructed, then evaluated with the Eigenvalue Decomposition technique.  When all 
players perform this properly, they will all come up with the same left-principle 
eigenvector. This vector represents the Eigentrust rating of each player. The algorithm 
has been well received as a foundation for more robust distributed systems, though 
trust itself needs further refinement to be properly defined [7]. In real distributed 
system deployments, Eigentrust would be done in a distributed fashion [22].  
Table 1. Utilities for various actions 
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Given these ingredients, the basics of each round of our game can be described 
with an immediate snapshot of the game matrix.  There are essentially three choices 
every player can choose: lie, tell the truth, or stop playing with the other player.  The 
potential benefit from the truth is an average of δmin and δmax, the upper and lower 
bounds of what the information is worth. A lie of course carries no value, but 
checking as to whether a piece is legitimate or not does carry a cost. The expected 
cost of verification is determined by the cost of verification CV times the probability 
that verification will occur coupled. The probability of verification is determined by 
three factors: (i) the type of the agent i (σi) (ii) the minimal probability of verification 
for agent i (Pi) (iii) the Eigentrust value tj assigned to the opponent j. However, certain 
118 R. Layfield, M. Kantarcioglu, and B. Thuraisingham 
behaviors never consider verification as a possibility, regardless of trust, and as such 
the verification has no effect on the result. For example, a player may want to accept 
the provided information without any verification. In that case, we can set the σi as 0.  
The table 1 summarizes the payoff matrix for each information exchange transaction. 
3.1   Behaviors 
In our analysis, we considered various different types of agent behaviors. The Honest 
behavior takes a naïve approach to other players. Truth is the only strategy ever 
chosen, and it never verifies the strategies of other players. It has the advantage of 
never incurring the cost of verification, and it always maximizes the potential gains 
with other players by never severing the links. An example may be a country that 
wishes to set an example, or perhaps is simply under significant amounts of scrutiny.  
While this may prevail against behaviors that perform even the slightest verification, 
they will always lose in a competition with the Dishonest behavior. Essentially 
serving as the opposite of the Honest behavior, this behavior simply chooses the Lie 
strategy regardless of the outcome.   
Not every player may believe that a predictable behavior is optimal. The Random 
behavior picks either Truth or Lie with equal probability. No punishment or 
verification is ever performed. Countries that wish to avoid being anticipated may 
choose this strategy. It carries the same benefits as the Dishonest behavior, but 
potentially only gains at most half the benefit.   
In our prior work [21], we encountered a unique yet simple approach to dealing 
with undesirable behavior known as the Tit-for-Tat behavior. Devised by Anatol 
Rapoport [13, 14], it follows a simple strategy selection process. Initially, it selects 
the desirable strategy (Truth). From that point on, it simply selects the same strategy 
as its’ opponent within the game. This was proven quite effective against all but the 
most sophisticated collaborative opponents [23]. In our simulation, however, being 
able to mimic the opponent’s actions requires constant verification.  
Our devised behavior from our prior work is the LivingAgent. Initially, like Tit-
for-Tat, the Truth strategy is chosen.  During each transaction, there is a probability Pi 
that the player will verify whether or not the other player told the truth. If a lie was 
told, the other player is punished by severing the link for RS rounds. This is a sacrifice 
in the sense that, if the other player is telling the truth for at least part of the time, 
further opportunity will be lost. The goal with this behavior is to place a high price on 
deviation. A country which behaves in this manner may be attempting to send a 
message to the rest of the participants, or may simply be unwilling to waste time with 
participants whom are equally unwilling to share valid information.   
A variant on this behavior is the SubtleLiar, which obeys the same principle but 
has a threshold in which it will automatically choose the Lie strategy. The net effect is 
a behavior which can take advantage of a low Pi and net a slightly larger gain in 
information. An example of this behavior may be countries that believe their fellow 
members trust them enough to be taken advantage of.  
Finally, we have the Liar. This behavior is almost identical to that of LivingAgent, 
with one notable exception. Is called Liar simply because it essentially tries to pass 
itself off as a honest participant while consistently trying to take advantage of the 
right situations. Assuming that the value of the information about to be received is 
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known in advance by both, the Liar will always lie if the received value is within a 
certain threshold of maximum value. Thus, this agent appears to capitalize on 
advanced information by attempting to only take a risk when the gain appears to be 
sufficient. This threshold is determined by the constant  δvaluable.  
4.   Experimental Setup 
Our experimental setup involves creating an alliance of 100 virtual countries. They 
begin with equal levels of trust, and hold all of their peers in the same regard. Each 
experiment begins by distributing initial behaviors based on a configuration file. The 
behaviors are assigned to each player based on the distribution specified within the 
file. During each round of the simulation, a transaction is executed between all 
possible combinations of players through a virtual link. After this round, the trust 
metrics are updated, history files are recorded, and agents receive their payoff based 
on the results. This payoff is used to directly determine the performance of the agent 
itself. The value of the information varies between δmin = 3 and δmax = 7. If the 
information provided is false, it has no value. In the event verification is performed, it 
comes at a cost CV, set to a value of 2. Thus, even if all information is verified, a net 
gain is still possible. When verification occurs, and no lie was told, it is noted as 
waste. The overall score a player receives is simply the total value of all information 
sans any cost incurred. The threshold for Liar to lie is at 6.9.  
All players are assumed to be willing to change their behavior to a more effective 
one, based on the performance of their neighbors. To simulate this, every 5,000 
rounds, each agent is assigned a new behavior based on a weighted probability 
assigned based on the total gain achieved. For example, if the Honest agent has an 
total net payoff of 10,000, while Dishonest has a total net payoff of 20,000, each 
agent has a 33% chance of choosing Honest and a 67% chance of choosing Dishonest.  
Thus, the new distribution reflects the relative performance of all agents. Note that 
while this method does not necessarily guarantee an ineffective behavior will be 
eliminated, it will ensure that any effective choice will be much more likely to emerge 
victorious. The simulation ends when either 100,000 rounds have passed or all players 
have chosen the same behavior, the latter considered a ‘win’ by the behavior adopted 
by the rest. 
There are several verification rates possible for a LivingAgent-derived behavior.  
To ensure a larger search space is explored during the experiment, a small mutation 
rate is introduced on Pi for each player behavior that is copied. This allows players to 
adapt over time and consider reducing the potential waste as the system approaches an 
equilibrium in which all participants tell the truth. 
5   Experimental  Results 
The LivingAgent performed admirably against Tit-for-Tat, even when the latter 
behavior began in the experiment with twice as many players adopting it. Out of all 
experiments, neither the Dishonest nor the Tit-for-Tat behavior ever successfully 
became the dominant behavior. However, the LivingAgent behavior only won the  
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Fig. 1. Success of various strategies against LivingAgent 
game 87% of the time, while Liar won the rest. The average verification rate was 
14.8% in the final behavior tally, while the average standard deviation was only 2%, 
taking an average of 15 generations to declare a winner.   
In figure 1, we see that LivingAgent successfully achieved the majority behavior 
despite beginning as a much smaller population. At first, Liar benefits from the fact 
that it and the rest of the behaviors engage in punishment.  Those that leave the 
Dishonest behavior go towards both LivingAgent and Liar, with more towards Liar.  
However, Dishonest is no longer being used, Tit-for-Tat begins to help LivingAgent 
by working slightly against Liar. A trend in the results is that once LivingAgent 
achieves half of the population, the Liar behavior rapidly loses ground to the point of 
complete loss. This appears to be the critical mass for the behavior in such a situation.   
When Tit-for-Tat was able to sustain itself for at least 10 generations, LivingAgent 
often benefited from this indirectly. The Liar players, even when they initially surged 
ahead, would usually observe that Tit-for-Tat was a better choice. As Tit-for-Tat 
increased, LivingAgent took some losses, but the efforts ended up working in concert 
to reduce the threat of a lying behavior. Ultimately, once Tit-for-Tat was no longer in 
play, LivingAgent needed only to compete with a smaller pool of malicious players.   
Another trend that made itself apparent is that the verification rates of the 
LivingAgent did not correlate directly with the number of malicious agents present.  
In many instances, as the number of Liars increased, the average rate continued to 
drop. In these cases, it appears that players simply cannot afford to refuse doing 
business with other players that ran the risk of lying. Essentially, the punishment 
method ended up only punishing the enforcer. 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the LivingAgent approach, we ran 
experiments involving all behaviors not derived from it (Figures 2 and 3). The 
behaviors here were only Dishonest, Honest, Tit-for-Tat, and Random. The first thing 
we noticed is that there was automatically a large increase in the number of iterations  
 
 Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing 121 
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of various strategies without LivingAgents: Honest behavior winning case 
 
Fig. 3. Evolution of various strategies without Livingagents: Random agent winning case 
necessary. The winner was not always clear, and it appeared that the fluctuation in the 
payoffs alone caused some agents to benefit more than others. The biggest competitor 
to Honest was strangely Dishonest, even though both used the polar extremes of 
selecting a strategy, and neither made any efforts to check information validity.  
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Another issue that arose was how quickly Tit-For-Tat was eliminated at times 
within the first generations. This, however, was no surprise; the verification costs no 
doubt came at a high toll to the payouts. It contributed to the game by removing 
malicious behaviors consistently, but this often only resulted in a surge of Honest 
behavior adoptions. Once Tit-for-Tat was eliminated, malicious behaviors again rose 
substantially in numbers.   
Figure 3 shows an experiment where we find that the Random behavior has won. 
Again, Tit-for-Tat helps Honest surge ahead briefly, but the verification costs cause it 
to fail to function after only 7 generations. From that point on, Honest appears to be 
the certain victor, eliminating Dishonest. At generation 92, Random begins to 
succeed. Essentially, because Random does not discriminate against which players it 
lies to, it runs the risk of dropping off at just shy of 50% of the player market. This 
happens twice during the simulation, but due to fluctuations in information value, it 
eventually achieves victory. Note that this particular equilibrium took 197 generations 
to achieve, and it was primarily based on the delta in the value gained. 
There were only three winning behaviors out of all the experiments. The Honest 
behavior only achieved the majority 26.1% of the time. Out of those instances, only 
84% of them actually resulted in an equilibrium behavior. The Random behavior 
faired equally well, with only a slightly smaller number of wins at 23.3%.  However, 
the Dishonest behavior beat both of them twice as often at 53.3% as either of them.   
In reality, players within these games can vary widely in their ulterior motives, 
beliefs, and decisions. To observe this, we wanted to observe all of the devised 
behaviors in action (Figure 4). Unsurprisingly, Honest won 99% of all games played. 
The abundance of malicious agents, coupled with a roughly 3:1 starting ratio to the 
Honest behavior, allows LivingAgent to flourish briefly. However, as malicious  
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agents begin to disappear due to lack of relative performance, the appeal of the 
Honest approach eventually coerces a majority of agents away from it. The loss of 
Dishonest and Random predictably caused a 25% drop in. 
On the surface, it may appear that our own LivingAgent is a failure under these 
circumstances. If our goal was simply to find the ‘perfect’ behavior, this would indeed 
be true. However, our constructed behavior helps to create an environment in which 
the Honest behavior can flourish. Thus, the end result is still the ideal, truth-telling 
environment. Since previous results demonstrated that Honest would normally fail 
against the malicious competitors, the introduction of our behavior has acted as an 
indirect policing force within the system.  The Honest behavior achieved the majority 
roughly 97% of the time within our initial experiments, over three times what it 
achieved under similar conditions on its’ own.   
Additional experiments were performed to observe the minimum behavioral mix 
necessary to ensure Honest would succeed, performed in the form of ratios between 
LivingAgent and Honest. When equal parts of both behaviors were present, Honest 
won 86% of the time. Increasing the ratio of LivingAgent to Honest to 2:1, it increased 
to 92% of the time. At a ratio of 3:1, an effectiveness of nearly 100% was achieved.  
Thus, although LivingAgent benefited the rest of the group in achieving a truth-telling 
majority, significant numbers of LivingAgent were needed to guarantee it. 
6.    Conclusions 
The overall experiment was a relative success. When enough players choose a behavior 
that reflects our approach to punishment, the malicious behaviors were successfully 
eliminated from consideration. The underlying nature of LivingAgent allowed it to 
defeat even variants of its’ own behavior involving light amounts of deviation. 
However, the same nature of the persistent verification meant that the behavior did not 
succeed against the Honest behavior, which performed no verification whatsoever 
despite the circumstances. Even in these circumstances, the ideal situation still arose, 
allowing players to conclude that honesty is indeed the best choice. 
We hope to increase the robustness of our punishment method in scenarios closer 
to reality. In real life, information cannot always be verified with 100% accuracy, nor 
do even the best intelligence agencies guarantee that information provided will be 
completely true. Such inadvertent mistakes would result in a system which potentially 
punish otherwise trustworthy players. This can be addressed with a mixture of a 
higher tolerance for lies and a slightly more relaxed punishment.  Our future work 
will explore this problem in depth.  
The growing size of networks such as the internet and the increasing use of 
distributed systems suggest that centralized authority approaches will be insufficient. 
Insuring behavioral choices by members of peer-to-peer networks requires an 
approach which can scale as much as the system itself. We believe our work offers a 
solution to the problem of encouraging behavior when players become responsible for 
their own outcome.   
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